POLICY PHENOMENON:HOW TO COMBAT ECONOMIC CRIME INCLUDING MONEY LAUNDERING ?

Economic crime is neither capitalist nor socialist phenomenon. Economic crime including money laundering is international phenomenon that produced by forces outside each country's control. Economic crime including money laundering is always and everywhere a policy phenomenon.

Economic crime including money laundering is a part of the major transnational organized crime. In order to combat economic crime, domestic, regional, and international law enforcement cooperation is required.

 

There is no an exact definition of economic crime, we should simply define economic crime as “offences which cause or risk causing substantial loss”.

Money laundering is the processing of criminal proceeds, generated as a result of predicate offences, including economic crime, to disguise their illegal origin, or to “legitimize” ill-gotten gains by disguising the sources or changing the form . It appears that the trend with economic crime of this generation is to launder all the proceeds at the end of the day; therefore, there is a need to investigate economic crime focusing also on the possibility of money laundering.

Banks and other financial institutions can be major target in laundering operations because they provide a variety of services and instruments that can be used to conceal or disguise the source of money. Money laundering damages the reputation for integrity of financial institutions, and frightens away honest investors.

Money launderers are criminals and, if the proceeds of crime are successfully laundered, will cause or risk causing further substantial loss to the financial sector and other large sectors of the economy. It is therefore important for each government

1. To institute a comprehensive domestic regulatory and supervisory regime for bank and non-bank financial institutions, and to do everything possible to prevent and detect economic crime within its system.
2. For all financial institutions to do their best in strengthening their cooperation with respective governments, especially with law enforcement agencies or prosecutors.

The modus operandi of most economic crimes shows that there is connivance amongst members of legitimate organizations; sometimes including bank officials and government officials and monetary reward is offered to them for illegal services rendered. Sometimes bogus securities are offered to the banks when criminals get loans from the bank.

Criminals forge payment orders, cheques and other financial instruments. Criminals also acquire false identity cards for their criminal activities. There are also organized criminal groups who print forged documents to facilitate fraudulent transactions. There are also criminals specializing in forging signatures. It is interesting to note that sometimes not all the criminals know each other within their syndicates while committing crimes.

The prevalent forms of economic crime in Japan are loan sharking, the “It’s me” scam and fictitious bills. In the “it’s me scam”, elderly people who live apart from their children or grandchildren often become victims. Criminals call a victim pretending that they are the child or grandchild of the victim and say that they are in urgent need of money because they are being held responsible for a car accident or they are chased by creditors for repayment of a loan.

The victims often pay the money into the designated account believing that the caller is their real child or grandchild. In fictitious billing, offenders send fictitious bills to many people using postcards and e-mails arguing that the fee for a pay web site is due. Offenders say “Non-payment is on our record and there is no room for argument. Unless you make the payment immediately, we will visit your house or office to collect the money” and make the victims transfer the money to the designated account without giving them enough time to check the legitimacy of the charge.

Lists of prospective victims who are vulnerable to this type of crime, such as the elderly who live alone or Internet users, are distributed among criminals. Based on this list, criminals select victims to commit these crimes against. Fictitious bank accounts and cell phones are used to contact victims or transfer and receive money in these crimes, including loan sharking.

Fictitious accounts are also used to conceal proceeds of crime. These crimes are professionally conducted by organized groups comprising multiple members. Organized criminal groups called Boryokudan (Yakuza) are often involved. It is believed that they make up a large scale organization with members playing different roles such as acquiring fictitious accounts and cell phones.

The major forms of economic crime are fraud, forgery, theft by conversion (common law crime), violation of the Prevention of the Corruption Act and tax evasion. The modus operandi in the fraud is that suspects connive to purport that some goods have been supplied to a company or government department. A fictitious invoice is made to facilitate payment. When a payment is effected, then the suspects share the crime proceeds. Usually this money is invested with asset management companies to hide their ill-gotten money. The other form of fraud is that suspects alter figures on bank instruments like cheques, demand drafts, payment orders and traveller’s cheques.

The common economic crimes in Nepal, for example, are tax evasion, human trafficking and money laundering. In tax evasion cases, real business transactions are not shown to the income tax authorities. To evade VAT (Value Added Tax) excise duty the businessman undervalues their production and is involved in the practice of nonbilling. In the import trade the businessman commonly uses under invoicing of goods; their incorrect declaration of imported goods enables them to evade custom duties. In Nepal, when human trafficking takes  place victims are normally informed that they are being taken for employment abroad. Another common method is pseudo-marriage. In this case, a trafficking agent gets married with a victim without fulfilment of legal or customary proceedings, and takes his “wife” out of the country and sells her.

Hundi/Hawala (an illegal underground banking system) is a common method of money laundering in Nepal. The Hundi people have their network almost all over the world. Instead of transferring money through official financial institutions money is transferred by individuals to different countries. The increase of Nepalese people in foreign employment has provided an opportunity to the Hundi people.

In Indonesia there are many forms of economic crime like smuggling, tax evasion, drug trafficking, human trafficking, violation of copyrights, bank frauds, embezzlement, credit card fraud and fraud of certificates of bills of lading. Indonesia has criminalized money laundering but they are facing many difficulties in implementing the laws.

In Myanmar, the following offences relating to economic crimes are occurring like forgery, misappropriation, cheating, misuse of communications technologies, illegal export and import, offences relating to the investment law, offences relating to trade, banking frauds and offences relating to foreign exchange.

The modus operandi of forgery is as follows: Criminals imitate letterheads and documents and they use these documents for the company concerned to do business transactions pretending to be real owners. Criminals also forge documents to get import and export licenses. In bank fraud criminals get loans from the banks using bogus securities. Criminals are involved in trading of foreign currency on the black market without permission of the Controller.

In Afghanistan although they are experiencing economic crime including human trafficking, counterfeiting of money and money laundering, enforcing relevant laws is very difficult because of the volatile post war situation and instability in the country. It is interesting to note that the modus operandi of economic crime is similar in many developing countries.

Money laundering in Nepal is carried out through bank services. Money launderers receive a letter of credit (L/C) by the bank to import goods. The importer is required to submit a copy of the bill of entry within a specific period from the date of issuance of the L/C. But a forged bill of entry is presented to the bank to transfer the foreign currency against a non-existent import. The L/C scandal is one of the examples of money laundering. In cases detected by the L/C commission 92 firms transferred US 35 million to third countries. The investigation revealed that in many cases no import had taken place, the parties of the L/C also could not be traced. The money deposited in the bank at the time of the issuance of the L/C was in cash. The bank secrecy law is not applicable to the investigation of corruption and money laundering cases.

In Japan, organized criminal groups called Boryokudan (Yakuza), with members exceeding 44,000, are suspected of being involved in various forms of economic crime including the “it’s me” scam, fictitious bill scam and loan sharking. In these criminal acts, cell phones and the Internet are used to contact fellow criminals or victims, in which case, electronic surveillance and undercover operations may be effective. These special investigative techniques, however, are very limited in Japan due to various constraints such as the protection of human rights of suspects. Wire-tapping has been used only a few times since the Communication Interception Law came into force in 2000, and undercover operations have been used in very limited occasions, namely investigations into drugs or firearms trafficking.

Nepal and Pakistan do not have specific anti-money laundering laws, although steps are being taken by both governments to enact the laws, and they are using other economic crime laws to combat money laundering.

The sentences for economic crimes including money laundering are not proportionate to the gravity of these crimes; therefore, they do not sufficiently serve as a deterrent for these crimes. For example, in Japan and Zimbabwe, although some criminals are involved in defrauding huge sums of money they get away with light sentences.

There is no global uniformity in combating economic crime including money laundering, since in developing countries they lack the resources like computers and camcorders for surveillance, they also lack training in learning effective methods for combating economic crime including money laundering. Thus, the developing countries need technological assistance to upgrade their systems. Since most serious forms of economic crime often involves transnational organized criminal groups and international transactions should be the fundamental basis on which we explore effective measures to combat economic crime including money

laundering.

1. Countries must have anti-money laundering laws in place. In criminalizing money laundering, countries should seek to apply such laws to the widest range of predicate offences and should include as predicate offences all serious crimes. Each state should enact laws to institute a comprehensive domestic regulatory and supervisory regime for financial institutions, including banks. 

2. Financial regulatory authorities in each country should play a pivotal role in the supervision of banks and non-bank financial institutions. A regulatory and supervisory regime should ensure that these institutions are complying with customer identification procedures, record-keeping, reporting of suspicious transactions and making efforts to prevent criminal’s use of their channels for the purpose of money laundering and other unlawful transactions.

3. Financial regulatory authorities should be encouraged to have their own administrative regulations in line with the government laws. These regulations must be able to safeguard loopholes against economic crime including money laundering. We need to explore ways to improve laws and practices in investigation, prosecution, adjudication and sanctions in order to combat economic crime including money laundering more effectively.

4. Each state should take, or at least should consider taking, the necessary measures to allow for the appropriate use of special investigative techniques such as electronic surveillance and undercover operations by its competent authorities for the purpose of effectively combating economic crime committed or suspected of being committed by an organized criminal group. Records of all known economic criminals should be kept; this will assist in sentencing them once they are arrested for repeatedly committing these economic crimes.

5. Each individual country should be able to maintain data on statistics for and trends in economic crime in order to assist in designing and implementing policing strategies. Investigative agencies and prosecutors must make every effort so that the courts impose stiffer sentences on criminals who have committed serious economic crime including money laundering, taking into account the gravity of such offence. This provides the safeguard against the extradition of a person for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing the person on account of his/her “political opinions”. However, such safeguard should be applicable only when the requested State has “substantial grounds” for believing that that is the case, and should not be misappropriated, taking into account the gravity of economic crime which causes or risks causing substantial loss.

6. Each country should afford one another the widest measure of mutual legal assistance in investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings in relation to economic crime including money laundering.

7. Each state should also consider the possibility of concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements. In case where a country does not have such agreements or arrangements, the law enforcement authorities of that country should endeavour to explore all possible measures, including using diplomatic channels, to request and obtain assistance from a foreign country. As investigators or prosecutors, we have to make every effort to explore better ways to ensure that effective and rapid assistance may be extended to one another. We should note that we have to make every effort to assist foreign authorities when properly requested, since mutual legal assistance is provided on a reciprocal basis.

8. Each country should cooperate closely with one another to enhance the effectiveness of law enforcement action to combat economic crime including money laundering and should, in particular, adopt effective measures to enhance and establish channels of communication between law enforcement authorities in order to facilitate the secure and rapid exchange of  information concerning all aspects of economic crime including money laundering. Novel modus operandi of or trends in economic crime would be worth sharing internationally.

9. Each country should initiate, develop or improve specific training programmes for its law enforcement personnel in order to keep them updated on the rapid evolution of economic crime including money laundering.

10. All countries should make concrete efforts in coordination with each other and with international and regional organizations to enhance their cooperation with developing countries, with a view to strengthening their capacity to prevent and combat economic crime. Enhancing financial, material and technical assistance to support the efforts of developing countries to implement the TOC Convention is also essential.

11. Each country should endeavour to adopt, maintain and strengthen systems for the recruitment, hiring, retention, promotion and retirement of civil servants that promote adequate remuneration and pay scales, in order to feasibly ensure that they are not corrupted. It is therefore important to educate employees of financial institutions in order to strengthen their cooperation with law enforcement agencies. To promote public awareness on the modus operandi of economic crime is also essential in order to warn people who are vulnerable to economic crime.

Thus, economic crime including money laundering is an international phenomenon.  All countries should put their heads together and establish effective money laundering laws and respect FATF 40 + 9 recommendations. The few countries that have not yet criminalized money laundering must ensure that they have criminalized this monster because all the proceeds of economic crime are laundered at the end of the day.

Developed countries must support developing countries in their training programmes and allocation of resources because without expertise and without resources, these developing countries will not be able to tackle modern forms of sophisticated economic crime including money laundering.

SUÇ GELİRLERİNİ AKLAMA DÖNGÜSÜ: SUÇ ÜÇGENİ

Suç gelirlerini aklama çoğunlukla genel olarak birbirinden ayrılması zor karmaşık bir dizi işlem içerir. Ancak, üç aşamayı genel olarak ayırt edebiliriz:

1. Yerleştirme:

Yasadışı faaliyetlerden elde edilen gelirlerin fiziksel olarak elden çıkarılması. Bu ilk aşamada, suç gelirlerini aklayıcı, yasadışı yollarla elde ettiği kazancı mali sisteme sokar. Bu genellikle, paranın hem yurt içi hem de uluslararası finansal kuruluşlar, kumarhaneler, dükkanlar, döviz büroları ve diğer işletmeler aracılığıyla sirkülasyona sokulması ile gerçekleştirilir. Bu aşama şu işlemleri içerebilir:

a. Yüksek tutarlardaki nakdin küçük meblağlara bölünmesi ve bunların doğrudan bir banka hesabına yatırılması.

b. Nakdin yabancı finansal kuruluşlara yatırılmak üzere veya çek veya banka havalesi yoluyla ödeme yapılacak şekilde yeniden satılabilecek sanat eseri ve kıymetli metaller ve taşlar gibi yüksek değerli mallar almak üzere yurt dışına taşınması.

2. Ayrıştırma:

Yasadışı kazancın kaynağını gizleme amacı taşıyan mali işlemlere ayrıştırılarak ayrılması. Bu aşama suç yoluyla elde edilen kazancın bir başka biçime dönüştürülmesi ve paranın denetleme yolunun, kaynağının ve mülkiyetinin gizlenmesi için karmaşık finansal işlemlere ayrıştırılmasını içerir.

Bu aşama şu işlemleri içerebilir:

a. Yatırılan nakdin bir hesaptan diğer hesaba elektronik transferi

b. Yatırılan nakdin parasal enstrümanlara (örn. seyahat çekleri) dönüştürülmesi

c. Yüksek değerli malların ve parasal araçların alınıp satılması

d. Gayrimenkule ve kanuni işletmelere yatırım yapılması.

e. Genellikle offshore cennetlerinde kayıtlı olan tabela bankaların ve elektronik transferlerin kullanımı.

3. Bütünleştirme:

Yasadışı kazancı ekonomiye normal ticari para gibi yeniden sokarak söz konusu kazanca yasallık getirme. Suç gelirlerini aklama sürecindeki üçüncü ve son aşama aklanan kazanca yasallık kazandırmak için tekrar ekonomiye sokulmasını içerir. Bütünleştirme aşamasında, yasal ve yasadışı kazancı ayırt etmek son derece zordur. Aklayıcı parayı gayrimenkul, lüks varlıklar veya ticari teşebbüslere yatırmayı seçebilir.

FIRST MERCHANT OFFSHORE BANK

SUÇ GELİRLERİNİ AKLAMA YÖNTEMLERİ: MUHABİR BANKACILIĞI VE FIRST MERCHANT OFFSHORE BANK

KKTC'de lisanslı First Merchant Offshore Bank kitaplara destan olmuş, Finans tarihimizin ilk "kara para aklama" olayıdır. Yabancı otoriteler tarafından devamlı olarak kara para aklama zincirine örnek bir olay olarak gösterilmektedir.

Bir Hong Kong yatırımcı grubu tarafından 2004 yılında açılan bir davada, ABN Amro’nun New York şubesinin, Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti’nde bulunan First Mechant Bank Offshore Ltd'in, bankanın grubu aldatmasına izin verdiğini iddia edilmiştir.

Davaya göre, ABN Amro 1998 yılında New York şubesinde First Merchant Bank için açmış olduğu altı muhabir hesap hakkında gönderilen birkaç uyarıyı dikkate almamıştır. Sonrasında, şube, biri Kıbrıs Merkez Bankası tarafından gönderilen, bankayı First Merchant bankasını da içeren iki kuruluş ile iş yapmanın finansal ve itibari riskleri hakkında uyaran iki uyarı mektup almıştır. Daha sonra daha fazla uyarı mektubu gelmiş fakat banka 2000 baharına kadar First Merchant hesaplarını kapatmamıştır.

Davada ABN Amro’nun First Merchant ve hesapları hakkında uygun şekilde durum tespiti yapmadığı ve şunları içeren kırmızı bayrakları göz ardı ettiği iddia edilmiştir:

■ First Merchant yalnızca Kuzey Kıbrıs’tan bir offshore lisansa sahipti;

■ Banka Kuzey Kıbrıs’ta küçük bir ofis dışında herhangi bir fiziksel ofise sahip değildi;

■ New York’ta bankacılık veya menkul kıymet lisanslarına sahip değildi;

■ İddiaya göre başkanı ve idari müdürü Hakkı Yaman Namlı 50 milyon ABD Dolarının aklanması ile bağlantılı olarak İtalyan makamları tarafından aranmaktadır.

Banka aynı zamanda Federal Reserve ile, bankanın New York muhabir hesabındaki ve takas hizmeti bölümlerinde suç gelirlerinin aklanmasını önleme kontrollerini sıkılaştırılmasını öngören bir yazılı sözleşme imzalamıştır.


Kara Para Aklama Davası ve First Merchant Offshore Bank

Çetenin Yavruları ve First Merchant Offshore Bank

Hakkı Yaman Namlı ve First Merchant Offshore Bank

KKTC Merkezli First Merchant Offshore Bank

Skandal Banka Kara Listede: First Merchant Offshore Bank


FIRST MERCHANT OFFSHORE BANK: OFFSHORE GANG...!

In August 2004, US Treasury blacklisted First Merchant Bank because:

Pursuant to Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, FinCEN (Treasury) found First Merchant Bank to be of primary money laundering concern based on a number of factors, including:

(1) it is licensed as an offshore bank in the TRNC, a jurisdiction with inadequate anti-money laundering controls, particularly those applicable to its offshore sector;


(2) it is involved in the marketing and sale of fraudulent financial products and services;


(3) it has been used as a conduit for the laundering of fraudulently obtained funds; and


(4) the individuals who own, control, and operate to launder criminal proceeds.

All of which is apparently true. The problem is that this was all publicly known at least as far back as 1997, when a member of the Susurluk Commission said that First Merchant Bank was being used to launder money and finance terrorism for the "Susurluk Gang".

In fact, Treasury essentially admitted that they knew all this when they blacklisted First Merchant Bank in 2004:

Domestic and foreign newspapers and magazines report that First Merchant Bank has been used for illicit transactions since its founding in 1993. Apparently, First Merchant Bank was established, at least in part, to facilitate the movement of funds between organized crime rings and corrupt politicians. The earliest indicators of illicit activity on the part of First Merchant Bank or its principals involved the original shareholders or partners of the Bank.

One of the original partners of First Merchant Bank is reported to be a former KGB employee identified as Vladimir Kobarel, who allegedly involved First Merchant Bank in transferring underground money to Russian banks. Another original partner, Tarik Umit, was a former Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) member who was believed killed in connection with a well-known Turkish investigation into links between the Turkish mafia, the MIT, and right wing politicians (the Susurluk scandal).

First Merchant Bank, Tarik Umit, and Dr. Hakki Yaman Namli (owner of the First Merchant Offshore Bank Ltd.) are alleged to have been involved with the laundering of $450 million in narcotics proceeds for the Susurluk Gang.

The Susurluk Scandal began with an automobile accident in Susurluk, Turkey, on November 3, 1996. Four people occupied the automobile: The deputy police chief of Istanbul; an alleged "extreme nationalist hit man'' previously convicted of heroin trafficking and wanted for terrorism; the hit man's girlfriend...; and a member of the Turkish Parliament, whose private militia had helped the army fight Kurdish militants.... The trunk of the car was full of weapons.

The incident received national notoriety and served as the basis for Parliamentary investigations into links among politicians, the arms trade, and organized crime.

Despite this, it took the US Government until 2004 – 3 years after 9/11 – to shut down First Merchant Bank.

1. Took them three years to shut down First Merchant Bank despite the fact that, according to the Wall Street Journal, Al Qaeda was known to be using the TRNC to launder money.

2. Took them three years to shut down First Merchant Bank despite the fact that the FBI knew that the bank was being used for these purposes by early 2002 at the latest.

3. Took them three years to shut down First Merchant Bank despite the fact “the criminal Turkish networks” had “direct and indirect role and ties” to 9/11.

4. Took them three years to shut down First Merchant Bank, despite the fact that, “After 9/11, the US Government engaged in mock investigations and shut down many small Islamic charities and organizations, giving the appearance of action in the so-called ‘War on Terror.’”

SUÇ GELİRLERİNİN AKLANMASININ EKONOMİK VE SOSYAL SONUÇLARI

Suç gelirlerini aklamanın ve terörün finansmanının etkileri şunlardır:
1. Artan Suç ve Yozlaşma:

Başarılı suç gelirlerini aklama işlemleri suç teşkil eden fiillerin karlı yönlerini artırır. Bir ülkenin suç gelirlerini aklama cenneti olarak görülmesi halinde, söz konusu ülke bu suçu işleyecek kişileri çekecektir. Tipik olarak, suç gelirlerini aklama ve terörün finansmanı cennetlerinde şunlar bulunur:

a. Suç gelirlerini aklama için sınırlı sayıda öncül suçlar

b. Suç gelirlerini aklama yasaları ve düzenlemeleri kapsamında kısıtlı sayıda kuruluşun tanımlanmış olması,

c. Yasaların tam tatbik edilmemesi, zayıf cezalar, suç gelirlerini aklama ile ilgili varlıkların müsaderesini veya dondurulmasını zorlaştıran hükümler.

Suç gelirlerini aklamanın yaygınlaşması halinde, daha fazla yozlaşma görülecektir, zira suçlular devlet dairelerine, avukatlara ve finansal veya finansal olmayan kuruluşların çalışanlarına rüşvet teklif edecek ve böylece kendi pis işlerine devam edebileceklerdir.

2. Yasal Özel Sektörün Çökertilmesi:

Suç gelirlerini aklamanın en ciddi mikroekonomik etkilerinden biri özel sektörde hissedilir. Suç gelirlerini aklayıcıların yasal görünen paravan şirketleri veya yasal görünen ve yasal ticarete iştigal ediyor görünen fakat aslında suçlular tarafından kontrol edilen işyerlerini kullandıkları ve yasadışı fiillerle elde ettikleri kazancı yasal paralarla karıştırdıkları ve yolsuz biçimde kazanılmış kazancı gizledikleri bilinmektedir.

Bu paravan şirketler önemli miktarda yasadışı fona erişebilir, bu da paravan şirket ürün ve hizmetlerinin piyasa değerlerinin çok altında sübvanse edilmesini sağlar. Böylece, paravan şirketler mali piyasalardan sermaye fonları çeken yasal firmalar üzerinde rekabet avantajı elde ederler. Bu durum, yasal şirketlerin paravan şirketler ile rekabet etmesini zor ve hatta imkansız hale getirir. Açık bir biçimde, bu suçlu kuruluşların yönetim ilkeleri yasal ticaretin geleneksel serbest piyasa ilkeleri ile uyumlu değildir, sonuç olarak olumsuz makroekonomik etkiler ortaya çıkar.

Son olarak, paravan şirketlerin ve yasal şirketlerdeki diğer yatırımların kullanılması yoluyla, elde edilen suç gelirlerini aklamadan elde edilen kazanç, bazı ülkelerin ekonomisinde rol oynayan endüstri veya sektörlerin tamamıyla kontrol altına alınmasında kullanılabilir. Bu durum, varlık ve emtia bedellerindeki yapay bozulmalardan ortaya çıkan yanlış kaynak tahsisi nedeniyle parasal ve ekonomik dengesizlik potansiyelini artırır. Bu aynı zamanda vergilendirmeden kaçınmak için bir araç sunar, böylece ülkenin gelir elde etmesini önler.

3. Finansal Kuruluşların Zayıflaması:

Suç gelirlerini aklama ve terörün finansmanı ülkenin mali sektörünün sağlamlığına zarar verebilir. Özel bankaların ve menkul kıymet firmaları ve sigorta şirketleri gibi diğer finansal kuruluşların stabilitesini olumsuz yönde etkileyebilir. Gerçekten de, suç teşkil eden fiil, ilk internet bankası olan European Union Bank’ın iflası gibi tüm dünyada bir takım bankaların iflası ile bağlantılı olmuştur. Dahası, BCCI’daki dolandırıcılık ve suç geliri aklama skandalı ve bir alt kuruluştaki bir borsa simsarı tarafından gerçekleştirilen riskli türev planının ortaya çıkmasıyla 1995’de Barings Bank’ın batışı gibi 1990’larda yaşanan bazı mali krizler önemli suç veya dolandırıcılık bileşenleri içermiştir.

Suç yoluyla elde edilen kazanca itibar eden finansal kuruluşlar aktiflerini, pasiflerini ve operasyonlarını yeterli ölçüde yönetmede fazladan zorluklarla karşılaşmaktadırlar.

Suç gelirlerini aklamanın ters sonuçları genel olarak itibarla ilgili, operasyonel, yasal ve konsantrasyon riskleri olarak açıklanmaktadır. Bunlar birbiri ile ilişkilidir ve her biri finansal bir sonuçtur:

- Karlı ticaretin kaybedilmesi;

- Fonların geri çekilmesi yoluyla likidite problemleri;

- Muhabir bankacılık ilişkilerinin sona ermesi;

- Araştırma maliyetleri ve cezalar;

- Varlıklara el koyulması;

- Kredi kayıpları;

- Finansal kuruluşların hisse senedi değerinde düşüş.

İtibar riski, bir bankanın iş uygulamaları ve ilişkileri ile ilgili olumsuz şöhretinin doğru olsa da olmasa da kuruluşun kamu dürüstlüğüne duyulan güvene zarar vereceği yönündeki potansiyel risktir. Kredi alanlar, mudiler ve yatırımcılar, kuruluşu kapsayan suç gelirlerini aklama skandalı nedeniyle kuruluşla iş yapmaya son verebilir. Yüksek kalitede kredi alıcılarının olmaması kar getiren kredileri azaltır ve tüm kredi portföyü riskini artırır. Mudiler fonlarını geri çekebilirler. Dahası, bir bankaya suç gelirlerini aklayıcılar tarafından mevduat olarak yatırılan fonlara kararlı finansman kaynağı olarak güvenilemez. Büyük meblağlarda aklanan fonlar, genellikle elektronik transfer veya devlet tarafından el koymalar yoluyla finansal kuruluştan beklenmedik biçimde geri çekilebilir ve bu da olası likidite sorunlarına yol açabilir.

Operasyonel risk, yetersiz veya başarısız iç süreçler, insanlar ve sistemler veya dış olaylardan kaynaklanan kayıp potansiyelidir. Bu kayıplar, kuruluşların azalan, sonlandırılmış veya artan bankalar arası veya muhabir
bankacılık hizmetleri maliyetlerine maruz kalması durumunda ortaya çıkar. Artan kredi alma veya finansman maliyetleri de bu kayıplara dahil edilebilir.

Yasal risk, bir kuruluş için kayıplar veya artan giderler doğuran ve hatta söz konusu kuruluşun kapanmasına neden olan davalar, olumsuz kararlar, tatbik edilemez sözleşmeler, cezalar ve para cezalarının vuku bulma ihtimalidir. Suç gelirlerini aklama, suç gelirlerini aklama sürecinin hemen hemen tüm yönlerinde suçlular içerir. Sonuç itibariyle, yasal müşteriler de mali suçun kurbanı olabilir, para kaybedebilir ve kuruluşa karşı paralarının geri ödenmesi için dava açabilir. Bankacılık veya diğer kanun yaptırım daireleri tarafından, maliyetlerin artması, para cezaları ve diğer cezalar ile neticelenen soruşturmalar yürütülebilir. Aynı zamanda, bazı sözleşmeler suçlu müşteri tarafından gerçekleştirilen dolandırıcılık nedeniyle tatbik edilemeyebilir.

Konsantrasyon riski, tek bir borçludan kaynaklı olarak çok fazla kredi riski oluşmasıyla ortaya çıkan kayıp potansiyelidir. Düzenlemeler genellikle bankanın tek bir borçlu veya bir grup ilgili borçlular tarafından riske maruz kalmasını kısıtlar. Belirli bir müşteri hakkında veya müşterinin arkasındaki kişi veya müşterinin diğer borçlularla ne gibi bir ilişki içerisinde olduğu hakkında bilgi olmaması bankayı bu açıdan riske sokabilir. Bu durum özellikle ilgili karşı tarafların, bağlı borçluların ve geri ödeme için ortak bir gelir ve varlık kaynağının bulunduğu durumlarda söz konusudur. Kredi zararları tabi ki aynı zamanda tatbik edilemez sözleşmelerin ve hayali kişilerle yapılan sözleşmelerin bir sonucudur.

Bu sebeple, Basel Bankacılık Denetleme Kurulu üyelerinin banka sistemlerinin suç gelirlerinin aklanması maksadıyla suç teşkil edecek biçimde kullanılmasının önlenmesi hakkında 2001 Bankalar İçin Müşteri Durum Tespiti Dokümanı gibi bir takım beyanatları yayınlamıştır.

4. Ekonomi politikası ile ilgili kararların kontrolünün kaybedilmesi veya bu kararlardaki hatalardan kaynaklanan kayıp:

Suç gelirlerini aklama süreci ile ilintili büyük meblağlardaki paralar nedeniyle, bazı gelişmekte olan piyasa ekonomisine sahip ülkelerde devlet bütçeleri bu yasadışı kazançların yanında küçük kalabilir ve sonuç olarak devletler tarafından ekonomi politikasının kontrolü kaybedilebilir veya suç gelirlerinin aklanmasından doğan makroekonomik istatistiklerdeki ölçüm hatalarından dolayı politikalarda hatalar yapılabilir.

Suç gelirlerinin aklanması, aklayıcıların paralarını getiri oranlarının yüksek olduğu piyasalar yerine ödeme planlarının tespitinin daha az muhtemel olduğu piyasalara yatırması sonucunda, para birimlerinin değerlerini ve faiz oranlarını ters yönde etkileyebilir. Tahmin edilemeyen sınır ötesi para transferleri nedeniyle döviz kurlarında ve faiz oranlarında kararsızlık da görülebilir.

 Para talebinin suç gelirlerinin aklanması dolayısıyla ülkeler arasında geçiş yapması ve sonuç olarak yanıltıcı parasal veriler doğurması ölçüsünde, özellikle dolar ekonomilerinde para yekunlarının izlenmesi daha belirsiz bir hal alacağı için döviz kuru ve faiz oranı kararsızlığı açısından ters sonuçlar doğuracaktır. Ayrıca varlık ve emtia bedellerindeki yapay bozulmalardan dolayı yanlış kaynak tahsisi nedeniyle suç gelirlerinin aklanması parasal istikrarsızlık tehdidini artırabilir.

5. Ekonomik Bozulma ve İstikrarsızlık:

Suç geliri aklayıcıları, yatırımlarından kar üretmeye değil daha ziyade kazançlarını korumaya ve fonlarının kirli kaynaklarını gizlemeye ilgi gösterirler. Bu nedenle, paralarını fonların bulunduğu ülkede ekonomik açıdan faydalı olmayan faaliyetlere “yatırırlar”. Dahası, ekonomi büyüme de bu durumdan, suç gelirlerini aklama ve mali suçun, fonları sağlam yatırımlardan kazançlarını gizleyen düşük kalitede yatırımlara yönlendirmesi sebebiyle zarar görebilir.

Bazı ülkelerde, inşaat ve oteller gibi tüm endüstriler fiili talebe dayalı olarak değil suç geliri aklayıcılarının kısa vadeli çıkarlarına dayalı olarak finanse edilmişlerdir. Bu endüstriler suç geliri aklayıcılara artık uygun gelmediğinde, bunları terk ederler ve bu sektörlerin çökmesine ve bu kayıpları karşılamaya gücü yetmeyen ekonomilerde yüksek zararlara neden olurlar.

6. Vergi Geliri Kaybı:

Yasadışı faaliyetin temel biçimlerinden olan vergi kaçırma, belki de en açık makroekonomik etkiye sahip biçimdir. Suç gelirlerini aklama devletin vergi gelirini azaltır ve bu nedenle dürüst vergi mükelleflerine dolaylı olarak zarar verir. Aynı zamanda devletin vergi tahsilatını daha güç hale getirir. Bu gelir kaybı, suç yoluyla elde edilen vergilendirilmemiş kazancın bu şekilde değil de yasal yollardan elde edilmiş kazanç olması durumu ile mukayese edildiğinde genellikle daha yüksek vergi oranlarına neden olur.

Birçok ülkede ekonomik zorlukların merkezinde bütçe açığı yatar ve bunu düzeltmenin yolu öncelikle en ekonomik istikrar programlarına odaklanmaktır. Uluslararası Para Fonu üye devletlerin vergi tahsilat güçlerini artırma yönünde bazı çalışmalar yürütmüştür. Küçük iş sektörü vergi kaçırmanın önemli bir bağlantı noktası olsa da, bu sektör aynı zamanda ekonomik büyümeyi teşvik eder. Bu nedenle ekonomik gelişmenin görece ilk aşamalarında olan birçok ülkenin özellikle vergi kaçırmaya ve bununla bağlantılı suç gelirlerini aklamaya eğilimli olması muhtemeldir.

a. Özelleştirme Çabalarının Riskleri: Suç gelirlerini aklama birçok ülkenin özelleştirme yoluyla ekonomilerinde reformlar yapma çabalarını tehdit eder. Suçlu organizasyonlar daha önceden devlete ait olan teşebbüslere talip yasal alıcılardan daha fazla fiyat teklifinde bulunabilirler. Dahası, özelleştirme girişimleri genellikle ekonomik açıdan faydalı iken, bunlar aynı zamanda bir suç gelirlerini aklama aracı olarak da rol

oynayabilir. Geçmişte, suçlular yasadışı kazançlarını ve dahası suç teşkil eden faaliyetlerini gizlemek için marinalar, tatil yerleri, kumarhaneler ve bankalar satın alabilmişlerdir.

b. Ülke İçin İtibar Riski: Suç gelirlerini aklama veya terörün finansmanı cenneti olarak ünlenmek, bir ülkedeki kalkınma ve ekonomik büyüme için olumsuz etkilere neden olabilir. Yabancı finansal kuruluşların, gerekli olan daha fazla incelemenin kendilerine fazladan maliyete neden olması nedeniyle işlemlerini suç gelirlerini aklama cennetlerindeki kuruluşlarla sınırlama kararı alabilmesi nedeniyle yasal küresel fırsatları azaltır.

Suç gelirlerini aklama cennetlerinde bulunan yasal işletmeler mülkiyet ve kontrol sistemlerinin fazladan incelemeye tabi tutulması nedeniyle dünya piyasalarına daha az erişime sahip olmaktan mustarip olabilirler (veya erişim elde etmek için daha fazla ödeme yapmaları gerekecektir). Bir ülkenin finansal itibarı zarar gördüğünde, bunu tekrar kazanmak çok zor olup, zamanında uygun suç gelirlerinin aklanmasının önlenmesi kontrolleri ile engellenebilecek bir problemi düzeltmek için önemli devlet kaynaklarının kullanılması gerekli olur.

Diğer etkiler, uluslararası organizasyonlar ve diğer ülkeler tarafından alınan spesifik karşı tedbirler ve devlet yardımı alma yeterliliğinde görülen azalmadır.

7. Sosyal Maliyetler:

Suç gelirlerini aklama ile bağlantılı önemli sosyal maliyetler ve riskler bulunur. Suç gelirlerini aklama, bir suçu işlemeye değer hale getiren bir süreçtir.Uyuşturucu kaçakçılarına, kaçakçılara ve diğer suçlulara operasyonlarını genişletme imkanı sunar. Bu, devletin ortaya çıkan ciddi sonuçlarla mücadele etmek için yasalarıdaha sıkı bir biçimde uygulama ve sağlık bakım giderlerini arttırma (örneğin, uyuşturucu bağımlıların tedavisi) ihtiyacı nedeniyle maliyetlerinin artmasına neden olur.

Suç gelirlerini aklamadan dolayı suçluların elde ettiği ekonomik gücün büyüklüğü, toplumun her elemanı üzerinde yıkıcı etkilere sahiptir. Hatta yasal devletlerin gayri resmi olarak ele geçirilmesine bile neden olabilir. Diğer olumsuz sosyoekonomik etkilerinin yanı sıra, suç gelirlerini aklama ekonomik gücü piyasalardan, devletten ve vatandaşlardan suçlulara aktarır.

MONEY LAUNDERING AND TAX CRIMES: WHITE COLLAR CRIMES

The most hotly argued topic relating to money laundering is whether laws do - or even should - relate to tax crimes.

The issues revolve around two main areas. First is whether tax offences are a predicate crime within any particular jurisdiction. Many places around the world do not raise income by income tax, for example. And so evasion of income tax cannot be a crime. The second issue that there has long been a basic principle of international law that one country does not enforce the tax laws of another. In recent years, however, several inter-governmental bodies have sought to create a climate where tax investigations can be conducted across borders and then, by the application of laws relating to, for example, document fraud claim that the issue is not one of tax but of a simple criminal offence.

This is one area of considerable concern but it pales into insignificance against the greater picture of how those same inter-governmental bodies are pressurising governments to change domestic laws. The issue is simply one of sovereignty. Financial pressure is being brought to bear on countries, and efforts are being made to discourage financial institutions in some countries not to deal with their counterparts in others.

This issue has been the subject of considerable debate in the press including World Money Laundering Report.

Notwithstanding the debate on international issues, within any country, the question of whether tax crimes are a predicate offence for the purposes of money laundering laws is a question of the express provision of the counter-money laundering laws, or the interpretation of those laws by the Court. In most countries that have "all crimes" counter-money laundering laws, it is almost certain that tax crimes will fall within the catch-all provisions.

Tax offences fall on the border of what is and is not laundering in that the general principle that money a person lawfully receives cannot be laundered. However, the issue is, in fact, easy to understand. If a person who is liable to pay a 40% marginal rate of income tax receives £100 for work and fails to declare it, then £40 is money "stolen" from the Treasury. Therefore, he does not launder the £100, he launders the £40. It is the tax evaded that is laundered.

One complication that makes this difficult to understand is that in order to retain the £40, he actually puts the whole £100 through the laundering process. He has to try to show that he received £100 legitimately, in order to evade payment of £40.

Another complication is that the £40 is said to have been "commingled" with the remaining £60 and it has tainted the otherwise clean money. Therefore under general principles of asset seizure as applied in many countries, anything that is purchased with the £60 may be subject to freezing or forfeiture.

ALTERNATIVE TO THE BANKING: CHOP, HUNDI, HAWALA

There is an argument for saying that parallel banking is defined not by activity but by whether the activities are conducted by a regulated business. Banks have three essential functions - warehousing savings, lending money and settling obligations between customers. Advisory services are, in essence, developments or broking of one of these three. Parallel bankers strip out the basics and perform only one or more of those three functions.

It follows, then, that when we use the term parallel banking, we are not talking about any business activity different from that which is done by your retail banker whose business is to take your money and keep it until you want it back (warehousing), to pool it with the money he receives from all his other customers and then to lend it to customers that will pay a fee for the use of it (lending) and to assess the risk attached to that lending decision (broking).

However, your retail banker is subject to a considerable body of rules and regulations that govern his relationship with you, his relationship with his customers, his relationship with the state that grants him a licence to operate as a bank, and supervises the conduct of his business. Where that system of regulation and supervision breaks down - or is ill formed in the first place - fraud is simple and bank collapses are frequent.

The parallel banking industry works outside that system of regulation and supervision. In countries where a licence is required for a particular activity, and the conduct of the activity without a licence is a crime, parallel bankers are by definition criminals. But that does not make them fraudsters. There are many, many money transmitters who operate out of sight of the law, even where required to licence. They operate, often, within a close knit community, often using lines of communication built up all over the world over a period of decades - or in some cases millennia.

Some of the money transfer mechanisms (the chop, hawala, etc.) which form the basis of parallel banking were developed to enable the movement of value without the movement of money. This was so that banditry could be avoided.

Now, with the use of technology, the principles of moving value without money are available to all.

AML-CTF: CASE STUDIES

1. Cross-Border Activities:

A European FIU received some thirty disclosures from several exchange offices regarding Asian nationals residing in that country and remittances being made to their home country. The money was always deposited in cash and therefore the origin of the funds was unknown.

Analysis revealed the following elements:

􀂃 The regularity and scope of the transactions could not be justified by the economic profile of the individuals involved, that is, they did not perform any known professional activity, were not officials of a company, nor were they registered for Value Added Tax.

􀂃 Furthermore, the majority of these individuals were registered as candidate refugees.

􀂃 Several names and addresses of principals were linked to an organisation responsible for various terrorist attacks in Asia.

􀂃 Several individuals involved were known in a case related to human trafficking.

All these elements indicated that the transactions performed could be related to terrorism financing.

Given that the individuals involved did not perform any professional activities, the money was believed to have originated, in whole or in part, from illegal activities, i.e. trafficking in human beings.

Indicators:
• Transactions not in keeping with expectations
 
2. Fraud Related Activities:
 
Mr. L, a foreigner residing in Eastern Europe, opened a current and a securities account with a bank in Country A. Immediately after it was opened the current account was credited with amounts between 20 and 70 EUR. These were payments for articles sold on an auction site. The payments were mostly by order of persons from Western Europe. The communications referred to the sale of luxury brands. The money was subsequently transferred to Mr. L’s account in his country of residence. Over the course of a few months, the total sum amounted to several thousand Euros. There was no economic justification for opening bank accounts in Country A nor for the transactions being performed there as the individuals did not have any ties with the Country.

Searches on the auction site revealed that Mr. L used a different name and that the buyers had posted negative comments about him, mentioning that the goods offered by him were counterfeit.

The amounts deposited on Mr. L’s account to pay for the articles on the auction site were particularly low for luxury items and this was mentioned in the communications accompanying the payments.

All these elements indicated that the person was involved in counterfeit trade through an auction site and the proceeds were laundered through more than one account.

Indicators:
• Use of foreign bank accounts
 
3. Misuse of Business Facilities:
 
Company A, managed by Mr. O, sold a property to company B, managed by Mr. R, for a significant amount for which the deposit was paid in cash. A large part of the final price was also paid in cash. When the notary who had executed the transaction noticed these transactions he sent a disclosure to the European Financial Intelligence Unit.

The Unit’s analysis revealed the following elements:

􀂃 The notary deed showed that money for the cheque to the notary was put in the account of company A by way of a cash deposit two days before the cheque was issued.

􀂃 Information from the bank showed that company A and Mr. O’s personal account were credited by substantial cash deposits. This money was used for, among other things, reimbursing a mortgage loan, and was withdrawn in cash.

􀂃 Police sources revealed that Mr. O and Mr. R were the subject of a judicial inquiry into money laundering with regard to trafficking of narcotics. They were suspected of having invested their money into purchasing several properties in Europe through their companies.

Indicators:
• Purchase of valuable assets
 
4. Misuse of Charities:
 
A European national asked his bank for a direct debit instruction from his account to a NPO in Country A. The reference that accompanied this direct debit instruction referred to the sponsoring of an individual.

Further investigation revealed that the NPO was known to be closely linked to certain groups who financed acts of terrorism. Furthermore, the name of the individual who was to be sponsored was mentioned on the United Nations list of persons and organisations suspected of being linked to Osama Bin Laden, the Al Qaeda network and the Taliban.

 Indicators:
• Abuse of non-profit organizations
 
5. Misuse of Charities:
 
An NPO held an account on which two individuals from the Middle East, residing in Country D, held power of attorney. The bank found it unusual that the name of the account was not stated correctly by the principals and that some deposits included references in a foreign language which referred to terrorist activities.

Further investigation identified that the NPO’s account was credited by small transfers from several individuals and referenced as donations for the poor in the Middle East. Some cash deposits were also received. Some of the funds were subsequently withdrawn in cash.

Police checks revealed that the NPO was the subject of an investigation for the financing of terrorism. The funds collected by the NPO were apparently intended for training camps in the Middle East.

The police are investigating.

Indicators:
• Abuse of non-profit organisation
 
6. Misuse of Business Facilities:

X, a non-native, repeatedly went to several agencies of two exchange offices in a European country to exchange various currencies into Euros. This amounted to almost 2 million Euros over a period of a couple of months. There was no economic justification for the way these transactions were performed and X had no relation at all with the country in which he was performing these exchanges; he resided abroad and did not have any known professional activity.

The FIU's analysis revealed that there were similarities between X and other persons whose transactions also originated from the same country as X and that they resided in the same neighbouring country. They did not have any professional activity and reputedly were still students. Some of these transactions were even performed the same day within a thirty-minute interval.

Information from the FIU in the individual’s country of residence made clear that the individuals involved were known for trafficking in narcotics, which corresponded to the typological indicators in this case file.

The police are investigating.

Indicators:
• Currency exchanges / cash conversion
 
7. Fraud Related Activities:
 
The account of Mr. X with bank A in a European country was credited with a substantial amount by means of an international transfer by order of Mr. Y with bank B abroad. The next day Mr. X withdrew all the funds in cash. Subsequently bank A were informed by bank B that the transfer was fraudulent, the bank then disclosed to the FIU.

The Unit’s analysis revealed the following elements:

􀂃 Mr. X’s account was credited by a transfer from company P, established in a neighbouring country.

􀂃 An employment contract was signed between this company and Mr. X. This stipulated that the personal bank account of the latter would be credited by an international transfer. This transfer corresponded to the transactions disclosed by bank A. In accordance with the agreement Mr. X withdrew almost all of the money in cash. The rest of the money, which apparently corresponded to his commission, remained in his account.

􀂃 The money was subsequently transferred to a beneficiary in Eastern Europe through a money remittance service and later withdrawn in cash.

Apparently company P used Mr. X as a financial intermediary, using his account in exchange for a commission of 8%.

The first stage of the deceit was "phishing" of a private individual's account, then an international transfer being made unbeknown to the patron, which led to a money remittance to Eastern Europe via the account of another private person in the European country. The money was later laundered by means of cash withdrawal.

Indicators:• Phishing
• Unexplained business transactions
 
8. Fraud Related Activities:

A bank disclosed several suspicious transactions by Asian nationals residing in a Western European country who had opened several accounts in Country A. Over the period of a few months, the account of one of these Asians, Mr. X, was credited with various international transfers from Western Europe. The account was then debited by a substantial transfer to a foreign account in name of Mr. X as well as to accounts of other Asians. There was no economic justification for these transactions.

Analysis revealed the following elements:

􀂃 Mr. X was a tax consultant who was introduced to the bank by a lawyer.

􀂃 Mr. X and the lawyer later introduced other Asians to the bank.

􀂃 Mr. X was known to the police for fraud. He was suspected of having received money from Asians by offering interest of 4%-20%. The amounts assigned to him were never paid back. Part of the money was sent to Country A.

􀂃 Mr. X possibly moved part of the money from Eastern Europe to Country A to hamper further investigation into the origins of the money.

These elements indicate that the money credited to Mr. X’s account from Eastern Europe, which was partially transferred to an account abroad in his name, probably originated from the fraud that he had set up.

Indicators:
• Use of foreign bank accounts
 
9. Misuse of Charities:

Several individuals from the Middle East residing in a European Country X opened accounts with various financial institutions in the names of Company A and Company B, both companies having been established in Western Europe, and an NPO established in Country X. These foreign nationals were officers of the companies and organisation and all were active in film production and telecommunications.

Several cash deposits from foreign nationals took place on these accounts. The total of the deposited funds amounted to up to several million Euros. Part of the money was used to increase company A’s capital and part was used for international transfers to other companies which were also active in film production. Police sources revealed that company A’s managers were active in an organisation suspected of being involved in terrorism and the deposits were suspected to have originated from terrorist activities.

This case file was referred to the criminal court.

Indicators:
• Abuse of non-profit organizations
• Mingling
 
10. Misuse of Charities:

Mr X, of Middle Eastern origin, held two accounts that were solely credited by transfers from the social services and by several cash deposits.

The bank noticed several irregularities, firstly, there was no economic justification for the number of cash deposits as the individual did not have any known profession. Secondly, most of the deposits included references to the telephone industry.

Mr X also had power of attorney on the account of an NPO. This account was only used to perform cash deposits from donors. The amounts credited to the accounts of Mr X and the NPO were mainly withdrawn in cash by Mr X.

Police sources revealed that this NPO was a place of worship where Mr X performed services and they also revealed that this NPO could be linked to terrorist activities.

The police are investigating.

Indicators:
• Abuse of non-profit organisations

11. Alternative/Emerging Remittance Services:

An African national residing in a European country (Country Z) declared that he performed Hawala banking activities. His account was exclusively credited by cash deposits and numerous transfers for small amounts.

Over the course of several months the funds were transferred to company A in Africa. Shortly thereafter the funds were transferred to company B in Country Z. Companies A and B performed international money remittance services. According to the subject, he performed Hawala activities for fellow countrymen wishing to send money to Africa. However, he did not hold any position within companies in country Z where he executed the transactions and he was not registered as a representative of an authorised exchange office.

Police enquiries revealed that he was known to be a member of a terrorist organisation and it is thought that this alternative remittance system may have been used for terrorism financing.

Indicators:
• Underground banking / alternative remittance services
• Wire transfers
• Use of foreign bank accounts
 
12. Gambling:

A suspected drug trafficker was gambling large sums and using third parties to purchase gaming chips on his behalf. The casino reported this activity and multiple chip cash outs on the same day, some being transacted just below the legal reporting limit.

Further investigations found that the subject would send large cash payments to various entities in an Asian country through a remittance dealer, who was a compliant associate and therefore did not make reports on this activity to the FIU.

Indicators:
• Gambling activities
• Criminal knowledge of and response to law enforcement / regulations
• Structuring (smurfing)
 
13. Alternative/Emerging Remittance Services:

The suspects of this case purchased stolen bank account and credit card details from Russia and Eastern Europe via the internet. Payments for these purchases were made through international funds transfers (IFT's) of approximately £1,000 and by way of e-Gold payments. The principal was arrested on multiple fraud and computer crime offences in relation to using these bank details to withdraw funds without authorisation via internet transfers to 'mule' accounts.

Computers seized on arrest revealed details of IFT's transacted through money transfer businesses and e-gold. These transfer methods used by the suspect avoided reports being made to the FIU.

Indicators:
• New payment technologies
 
14. Fraud Related Activities:

Mr B sent emails to people claiming that they could obtain millions of dollars in return for sending him an up-front fee to cover expenses. This is commonly known as advanced fee fraud.

Searches conducted by the FIU identified persons of interest, including Mr B’s wife and associates.

As the investigation continued, analysts from the investigating agency conducted routine searches of the FIU database. These searches were performed to identify the victims of the scam and their location which was critical given the international nature of the offences. The financial intelligence gathered identified that the man had defrauded approximately 5 million dollars from his unsuspecting victims which was crucial in obtaining the man’s conviction.

He has been sentenced to more than 5 years jail having pleaded guilty to the internet scam.

Indicators:
• Use of the internet

15. Terrorism Financing:


A European national asked his bank for a direct debit instruction from his account to a non-profit organisation in another European country. The reference that accompanied this direct debit instruction referred to the sponsoring of an individual. Information collected by the FIU showed that this non-profit organisation was known to be closely linked to certain groups that financed terrorist acts. Furthermore, the name of the individual that was to be sponsored was also mentioned on the United Nations list of persons and organisations suspected of being linked to terrorist groups.

Indicators
• Abuse of non-profit organisations
 
16. Use of Gatekeepers:


An FIU in country Z received information from a foreign FIU regarding two trusts that were established there.

The trustee had been requested to make two payments in favour of a bank in an offshore finance centre.

Correspondence between the trustees and the settlor was always conducted through a law firm, which had also established the trust.

Investigation identified that the beneficiaries of the trusts were siblings. These subjects (Mr A and Mr B) were managers of two companies, established in country Z that had been the subject of a serious fraud investigation. Even though Messrs A and B were not managers of the companies at the time of the investigation, it became clear that part of the funds in the trusts may have originated from the criminal activity of the said companies as they were managed by their father at the time.

Indicators
• Use of gatekeepers
• Use of nominees, trusts, family members or third parties
• Use of offshore banks / businesses
 
17. Terrorism Financing:


The FIU of a European country (Country Z) were made aware of suspicious transactions on a bank account, over which Mr A held power of attorney. The account was held for a non-profit organisation established in country Z and was receiving large amounts of cash.

Mr A was vague in his explanation as to the source of funds and intimated that it was from donations.

As Mr A did not go to the branch office where the account was held, the bank refused to accept the deposits and advised Mr A to attend the branch office where the non-profit organisation’s account was held, however he failed to do so.

The FIU analysed the account and found that the debit transactions included a cheque that had been made out to a notary for the purchase of real estate.

This cheque was covered by the alleged donations and a transfer by order of Mr A. The analysis of Mr A’s personal account revealed multiple cash deposits that corresponded to donations from private individuals. The debit transactions consisted of transfers to the non-profit organisation and international transfers to Mr B.

Mr A was connected to individuals who were thought to be linked to terrorist activities, including Mr B.

It was revealed that Mr A used the non-profit organisation to raise funds and filtered these through his personal account, whilst siphoning some of them to Mr B, where they were possibly intended for terrorism financing.

Indicators
• Frequent cash deposits.
• Abuse of non-profit organisations.
• Purchase of valuable assets.
 
18.Terrorism Financing:


Mr X, a resident of a European country who originated from the Middle East held a bank account which received significant credits from abroad, which were immediately withdrawn in cash. Mr X stated that the money was from a family member abroad.

Apart from these international transfers, the account was also credited with several cash deposits by X a few months later.

Mr X was not known to have any professional activity and received state assistance.

He was known to the police for trafficking in humans and terrorism financing. These elements revealed that his account may have been used to place money from trafficking in humans intended for terrorism financing.

Indicators:
• Wire transfers
 
19.Terrorism Financing:


A political refugee resident in a European country held power of attorney over two accounts (at a bank in that country) in the names of his family members. He did not hold any accounts of his own. One of the accounts exclusively received state assistance benefit payments as the subject was unemployed and had no independent income. The other account was credited by cash deposits. All of the credits were withdrawn via cash machines, thus preventing the identification of the final beneficiary of the money.

Open source checks revealed that the subject had links to a terrorist organisation and further analysis suggested that he was a fund raiser for that organisation.

Indicators
• Use of nominees, trusts, family members or third parties
 
20.Terrorism Financing:


A subject opened two accounts in different branch offices of the same bank, in Country A where he had no official links. The first account was opened in the name of company X, established in North America, and the second one was opened in the name of company Y, established in another jurisdiction.

Both companies were active in the catering supplies sector and their accounts were mainly credited by significant cash deposits (often for round figures) and to a lesser extent by transfers from abroad by order of companies also active in the catering supplies sector.

The funds were then transferred to other European companies in the same sector.

No business rationale or economic justification could be found for performing these transactions in this manner.

Further enquiries found that the individual concerned was the subject of a terrorism investigation in another jurisdiction.

It is suspected that the catering supplies business and the co-mingling may have been a cover for his criminal activities.

Indicators
• Frequent cash deposits.
• Mingling.
• Wire transfers.
• Structuring.
 
21. Terrorism Financing:


A resident of a European country ‘A’ was repeatedly sending funds to his own account in the Middle East with an interval of a couple of days between each deposit.

The FIU in country ‘A’ learnt that the individual was the manager of a company active in the distribution of phone cards and that this company was already known to the police for fraudulent activity.

The subject also managed a phone shop that had already shown irregularities upon regulatory examination.

Enquiries made by Law Enforcement revealed that the individual was known to the police as a fundraising manager for a domestic terrorist organisation.

Analysis would indicate that the individual’s business activities could have been used as a cover for his criminal activities.

Indicators
Mingling